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This paper refl ects on the literature on courts and politics in Europe and the Unit-
ed States. US-American Political Science has dealt for over fi fty years with the role of 
courts and judges as political actors, whereas this perspective has only recently emerged 
in Europe. The debates differ not only with regard to the number of articles written, but 
also with regard to their content. This paper discusses the different research perspec-
tives that are being pursued on both sides of the Atlantic. While a major part of the 
US-American literature investigates the politics of judicial action and the politicization 
of the legal system, research on European courts confi nes itself to analyzing the effects 
of judicial action, often describing them in terms of juridifi cation. Based on a review of 
the existing literature, this paper suggests that European scholars ought to take crucial 
assumptions of the US-American research tradition more seriously.
Zusammenfassung
Während die US-amerikanische Politikwissenschaft seit über fünfzig Jahren Gerichte 
als politische Akteure begreift und untersucht, hat sich dieses Verständnis in Europa erst 
seit Kurzem durchgesetzt. Dabei unterscheiden sich die Forschungsperspektiven erheb-
lich. Ein bedeutender Teil der US-amerikanischen Literatur hat die rechtswissenschaft-
lichen Ansätze zur Erklärung juristischer Entscheidungen herausgefordert, indem er die 
politischen Grundlagen der Rechtsprechung und damit die Politisiertheit des Rechtssys-
tems untersucht. Demgegenüber beschränkt sich die europabezogene Forschung meist 
auf die Analyse der Auswirkungen rechtlichen Handelns auf Politik. Die Effekte werden 
dabei häufi g als Verrechtlichung beschrieben. Der vorliegende Text arbeitet die verschie-
denen Forschungstraditionen heraus und plädiert dafür, zentrale Annahmen der US-
amerikanischen Forschung auch in Europa stärker als bisher zu berücksichtigen.
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1 Introduction
In the United States, the perception of courts as political actors is widely shared, and Po-
litical Science has dealt with this topic for decades (Maveety 2003). A scholar attending 
one of the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association (APSA) can 
expect to fi nd between twenty and thirty panels on the linkage of law, courts, and poli-
tics. Scholars have investigated how judges make decisions and how they are appointed, 
how courts interact with the legislative branch, how interest groups make use of the le-
gal system and so on (to be discussed below). By contrast, in Europe “courts and politics” 
as a research topic is relatively new and not really established (Stone 1992a). Moreover, 
with regard to its content, the literature differs remarkably from the US-American work. 
The question of what exactly is political about jurisprudence is answered quite differ-
ently.
This paper discusses the literature on “courts and politics” on both continents. It does 
not provide original empirical research but presents refl ections on the state of this sub-
fi eld of Political Science. The article describes the historical development of research in 
the United States and Europe, thereby emphasizing to what extent the US-American 
literature has (or has not) infl uenced the European perspective. I will argue that the 
European scholarly community has developed a very distinctive (and incomplete) un-
derstanding of courts as political actors. A major part of the US-American literature 
has refl ected on and addressed the discipline of law, challenging the idea of neutral legal 
reasoning by investigating the politics of judicial action. By contrast, research on Euro-
pean courts has never claimed to explain judicial decision-making, but it confi nes itself 
to analyzing the effects of judicial action on politics and the political system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: It begins by discussing the question 
of why judicial politics has been a much more popular research topic in the United States 
than in European countries. Conventional wisdom explains this difference by pointing 
to the distinction between common law and code law countries (Shapiro/Stone 1994a). 
But with reference to the German case, I will argue in Section 2 that this explanation 
is not really convincing. Section 3 discusses and compares the US-American and Eu-
ropean streams of the literature. Section 4 draws some conclusions and suggests that 
European scholars take more seriously crucial assumptions of the US-American debate, 
which Europeans have not paid much attention to so far.
This paper was written while I was a visiting scholar at Northwestern University in 2006. I want to 
thank Kathleen Thelen and Brian Hanson for their support. The article has benefi ted a lot from 
discussions with Terence Halliday (American Bar Foundation), Sida Liu (University of Chicago), 
Elisabeth Broerman Muhlenberg (University of Illinois at Chicago), and Karen Alter (Northwestern 
University). Further, very helpful comments and suggestions were received from Andreas Broscheid 
(James Madison University, Harrisonburg), Cornelia Woll (Sciences Po, Paris) and from Philipp 
Klages and Wolfgang Streeck at the MPIfG.
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2 The scope of research
Most striking is the small volume and scope of research on European courts, which has 
only recently emerged. While there is an overwhelming body of literature on almost any 
imaginable aspect of judicial policymaking in the United States, especially with regard 
to the Supreme Court, much less work has been done on courts in other regions of the 
world, Europe included. In 1983, Lee Sigelman and George Gadbois stated that, since 
1968, only 0.3 percent of all articles published in “Comparative Politics” or “Compara-
tive Political Studies” had dealt with courts (Sigelmann/Gadbois 1983: 293). Roughly 
ten years later, Alec Stone found that nothing had changed (Stone 1992a: 6). By my 
own calculations, the share of articles on courts increased only slightly to 0.4 percent 
by 2005.
Since the 1990s, the linkage between courts and politics as a European research topic 
has been pushed here and there. Some major journals have published special issues 
which have also included the European perspective (e.g. Schmidhauser 1992; Volcan-
sek 1992; Shapiro/Stone 1994b; Vallinder 1994a; Cichowski 2006). Moreover, a small 
number of comparative edited volumes has vastly increased the international visibility 
of several scholars who had been researching courts in their home countries for quite 
some time (e.g. Holland 1991; Jackson/Tate 1992; Tate/Vallinder 1995; Jacob et al. 1996). 
In addition, the European Court of Justice has attracted scholarly attention (e.g. Stein 
1981; Burley/Mattli 1993; Garrett 1995; Alter 2001).
The growing volume of literature notwithstanding, research on judicial policy-mak-
ing in Europe remains limited in some respects. Firstly, research on the judiciary is 
hardly institutionalized in European professional organizations of Political Science. 
While “Law and Courts” is the fourth largest Organized Section in the American Po-
litical Science Association (ranking behind comparative politics, political methodology, 
and public policy), the European Consortium for Political Research does not even have 
such a section. Instead, the topic is subsumed under the newly established Standing 
Group “Regulatory Governance,” which also suggests substantive differences in the re-
search perspectives (to be discussed below). The lack of institutionalization applies to 
many national organizations of Political Science as well (e.g. in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, and Italy).
Secondly, research is limited to the issue of judicial review by constitutional courts, 
which is the most obvious and spectacular type of judicial politics, as it often involves 
repealing a law passed by the legislative branch. Ordinary or lower courts and judicial 
policy-making by means of creeping statutory reinterpretation have hardly appeared 
on the research agenda to date (but please note Koppen 1992; Verougstraete 1992). 
Moreover, courts are rarely integrated into the analysis of broader processes of political 
confl ict and mobilization.
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How can we explain this striking research gap? Why has the study of law, courts, and 
politics been so much more popular in the United States for the past fi fty years? The 
literature offers several arguments, and all of them are linked to the traditional distinc-
tion between common law and code law systems. Very often judicial policy-making in 
countries other than the United States is considered to be a relatively new phenomenon 
of the post-war era, when many countries in Europe and elsewhere established consti-
tutional courts with the power to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional (e.g. 
Stone 1992a; Shapiro/Stone 1994a; Vallinder 1994b). Many authors argue that, histori-
cally, European countries with a code law tradition had established a strong commit-
ment to the “separation of law and politics and to a vision of judges as independent, 
neutral law appliers rather than policymakers” (Shapiro/Stone 1994a: 398). The experi-
ence of totalitarianism and its violation of citizenship rights changed this attitude, in 
Germany more than in any other European country (Vallinder 1994b: 94–95). Courts 
were now seen as a means to monitor and review legislative activity and therefore to 
protect individual rights in the future. Through this shift they became more engaged in 
politics than before. But the European countries chose a path different from that of the 
United States, where each court has the capacity to declare a law unconstitutional. In 
several European countries, separate constitutional courts were established to perform 
the monitoring function (“European model” of judicial review). Confi ning the task of 
judicial review to special constitutional courts enabled the states to preserve the main 
principle of the European separation of powers doctrine (Stone 1992a: 225–226). Be-
cause judicial review by constitutional courts is a post-World War II phenomenon, so 
the argument goes, Europe-related research in this area is relatively newer than in the 
United States and has concentrated on constitutional courts.
A second prevalent explanation for the lack of European research is also linked to the 
alleged separation of law and politics in code law systems. Alec Stone argues that, given 
the distinctiveness of the legal system, academic discourse on this topic remained the 
privileged domain of law professors (Stone 1992a: 6). Moreover, the specialized techni-
cal-legal discourse requires the learning of a “second language” (Shapiro/Stone 1994a: 
398), which discouraged many political scientists from dealing with the issue. Surely, 
there is much truth in this. But still, at least with regard to Germany, these reasons can-
not fully explain why hardly any systematic research of courts and politics has emerged 
so far.
Firstly, one would have to pose the question as to why political scientists invest signifi -
cant time and effort in learning economics, statistics, and game theory, yet presumably 
hesitate to become acquainted with judicial methodology and language. Moreover, at 
least in Germany, modern Political Science emerged from the discipline of law. Some of 
the most prominent founding fathers were trained as jurists. Their work often included 
the analysis of courts and their effect on the functioning of the political system. Ernst 
Fraenkel analyzed the impact of Klassenjustiz (class-based justice) on democracy and 
on the labor movement as early as the Weimar era (Fraenkel 1999 [1927]). Franz Neu-
mann saw judicial policy-making as one driving force of “The Behemoth,” the National 
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Socialist state (Neumann 1963 [1944]), and Otto Kirchheimer investigated “political 
justice” in Germany, France and East European countries (Kirchheimer 1961). While 
these scholars had a major impact on the development of political and constitutional 
theory in German Political Science, and while they inspired a young generation of “crit-
ical jurists” in the 1960s (Iser/Strecker 2002), they did not motivate further research on 
“courts and politics” in Germany. By contrast, Kirchheimer’s work became prominent 
in the United States and was acknowledged as “a leading work” in a research tradition 
called “Political Jurisprudence” (to be discussed below) (Shapiro 1964b).
Secondly, the lack of any real interest of German Political Science in law-related issues 
and the courts is even more astonishing given the long German tradition of the Sociol-
ogy of Law (e.g. Max Weber, Niklas Luhmann, Juergen Habermas). In other words, Alec 
Stone’s argument that the law has been the privileged domain of law professors tells 
only part of the story. Sociologists (but not political scientists) in Europe have always 
refl ected on the law and the legal system.
Thirdly, while it is surely true that the establishment of judicial review has remarkably 
increased the political power of European courts since World War II, it is not true that 
judicial policy-making only began in this period, again at least with regard to Germany. 
Research on the Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime in the post-war decades has 
revealed this. Contrary to the idea of judges as law appliers instead of policy-makers, 
courts have been very much engaged in politics since the end of the First World War 
– not in the spectacular sense of striking down whole statutes, but by means of a creep-
ing reinterpretation of existing legislation in various fi elds of law. Long before the emer-
gence of the Nazi regime, the democratic republic of Weimar was transformed step by 
step into a conservative one – and jurisprudence played a major role in this process 
(Ruethers 1968). For scholars, such as Neumann and Kirchheimer, who recognized this 
process, it provided the reason to analyze the political role of the courts.
Just as in other countries in the early part of the twentieth century, German courts 
were inclined to defend liberal property rights and freedom of contract against a newly 
emerging regulatory state and its ambition to organize capitalist economies. For the US-
American debate on the power of the courts, the Roosevelt era is still crucial, because 
the Supreme Court abolished the social policy and labor law legislation of the New 
Deal government (McCloskey 2005: 91–120). A similar process took place in Germany, 
when the Reichsgericht (supreme court) declared any state intervention which affected 
private property to be an “expropriation” and thereby limited the government’s ability 
to change the status quo (Kirchheimer 1976 [1930]), or when the labor courts trans-
formed a class-based concept of collective bargaining rights into the conservative idea 
of a corporate community with mutual obligations of loyalty and care (Kahn-Freund 
1975 [1931]). In contrast to the United States, German courts were not able to play a 
veto role, but political power was exercised by transforming the meaning of a given rule 
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in the context of legal discourse and jurisprudence.1 Similar patterns of interaction be-
tween the courts and the legislative branch generated a Political Science research stream 
in the United States, but had no sustainable infl uence on Political Science in Germany.
Finally, it is surprising that the extensive literature on corporatist patterns of policy-
making in the 1970s and 1980s did not acknowledge the role of the courts and the legal 
system, although it has always emphasized that corporatism depends on state support 
(e.g. Streeck 1994; Streeck/Kenworthy 2005). Some of the policy fi elds in which cor-
poratism is (or was) especially strong are also marked by signifi cant case law elements 
and a high level of regulatory court activity, such as labor law or social law. Hence, to 
some extent self-regulation of interest groups has been accompanied by a high level of 
political court activity. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate how the legal 
system has contributed to the emergence and stability of corporatist networks, given 
that the European patterns of interest group politics have differed so much from the 
US-American experience, where the “litigious society” (Lieberman 1983) is explained 
by the absence of political institutions of interest intermediation and confl ict resolu-
tion (Kagan 2001). In the United States, a highly visible research community has in-
vestigated how interest groups have addressed the courts in order to protect women, 
workers, animals, consumers, patients, the environment, and so on (Golann/Fremouw 
1976; Handler 1978; Epp 1998; Feeley/Rubin 1998; Frymer 2003; Barnes 2006). This 
research tradition should have inspired European scholars to raise the question of how 
the courts and the legal system might (or might not) be contributing to patterns of 
interest representation.
To sum up, in Germany at least, Political Science has had several historical reasons for 
developing a strong “judicial politics” research tradition and, indeed, has witnessed sev-
eral relevant examples of this. Scholars could easily have discussed the particular role 
of courts and the legal system as a precondition for corporatist policy-making. But it 
seems as if the legal roots of Political Science simply got lost somewhere between then 
and now. Probably this development is due to the fact that Political Science in Germany 
was a latecomer: only after 1945 was it established as an independent discipline. And 
scholars aimed at emphasizing its differences from competing disciplines, such as Soci-
ology and Law (Maus 2006). Hence, perhaps it was not in spite of  but because of  its legal 
roots that Political Science in Germany abandoned the analysis of legal issues.
1 A second major difference was that at some point the US Supreme Court started to accept the 
policy of state intervention while the German courts did not do so, thereby actively contribut-
ing to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.
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3 Different perspectives on courts and politics
Research on US-American and European courts differs not only with regard to volume 
and scope; it also pursues different substantive perspectives. Or more precisely: Euro-
pean research has adopted only some aspects of the US-American debates. Scholars fre-
quently talk about “judicialization” here and beyond the Atlantic Ocean, which means 
that the legal system is politically relevant in one or another way (Vallinder 1994b). But, 
specifi cally, consensus ends with regard to the question of what “judicialization” means 
and how law and politics interact.
In the United States, research is conducted on almost any imaginable aspect of the ju-
diciary. And a very important part of the literature discusses the politics of judicial ac-
tion. In this view, the legal system is regarded as a part of the political system (Shapiro 
1964b). The authors emphasize the commonalities of courts and legislative institutions 
or governmental agencies. Judicial action is described as a sub-type of political action 
and as one element among broader political processes. Judges are regarded as policy-
makers driven by party affi liations or policy preferences. Just like parties or govern-
ments, courts are thought to be the target of interest group strategies. Hence, one very 
important research perspective refers to the political foundation of judicial action. This 
kind of analysis more or less takes away the distinctiveness of the legal system: 
Legal argument incorporates more non-legal materials and adopts modes of analysis that 
are not so distinct from other discourses. Law fi rms become more like businesses; courts 
become more like other governmental bodies …; legal academics become more like other 
academics. (Galanter 1992: 18)
In contrast, a major part of the literature on European courts emphasizes the opposite 
fl ow of interaction between law and politics. The dominant research perspective focus-
es on the political effects of judicial action and the process of juridifi cation (Stone 1992a). 
In this perspective, legal activity is not the extension of political action by other means, 
but it unfolds at the expense of political action (e.g. Landfried 1994). The legal system 
is not invaded by politics but follows its own logic. Moreover, it is not the legal system 
but the political system which loses its distinctiveness. In relation to the courts, govern-
ments are said to exercise self-restraint (Barreiro 1998) and to rely on judicial “techno-
cratic government” (Shapiro/Stone 1994a: 402); it is assumed that judicial methods of 
decision-making enter the policy process (Vallinder 1994b) and that judicial discourse 
penetrates political discourse (Stone 1994). The idea of juridifi cation has only recently 
emerged in the US-American literature. Scholars such as Mark A. Graber and George I. 
Lovell have started to investigate “legislative deferrals.” This notion means that legisla-
tive actors might be interested in delegating governing power to courts as a means of 
escaping accountability (Graber 1993; Lovell 2003).
The already cited argument put forward by Alec Stone that political scientists in Eu-
rope are less engaged in research on courts because this would require them to learn a 
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“second language” already hints at the different perspectives. Many scholars researching 
into the US Supreme Court would doubt that it is even necessary to understand the le-
gal discourse because, to them, judicial methodology is nothing but “a cloak to conceal 
the real bases for justices’ decisions” – namely policy preferences or personal values and 
attitudes (Spaeth 1995: 305).
This main divergence in the research perspectives affects many aspects of the debate, 
because it has an impact on the perception of the relevant actors and the concept of 
judicial power which underlies the research. The following sections provide a histor-
ical account of how research on judicial politics developed differently in the United 
States and in Europe. Both traditions did not evolve independently from one another: 
particular streams of the US-American discourse received attention in the European 
context and contributed to a particular European perspective on courts and politics. 
But other important messages sent by the US-American scientifi c community have not 
really been acknowledged in Europe so far. The idea of judicial decision-making as a 
political process is still more or less alien to Europe.
“Political Jurisprudence” in the United States
As mentioned above, the political analysis of the legal system has a long tradition in the 
United States. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, devoted two chapters of his Democ-
racy in America to the “political importance” of the courts (Tocqueville 1990 [1835]). A 
major impetus for the further development of this research tradition was given by the 
“legal realism” movement that enjoyed greatest prominence in the 1920s. This school 
of thought emphasized the interdependence of law, the legal system and society. The 
Realists attacked the discipline and practice of law, the dominant “mechanical juris-
prudence” and “formalism” of their time, by claiming the indeterminacy of law instead 
(Leiter 2002: 1). First, they argued that each and every law is vague, which implies, sec-
ondly, that legal reasoning and judicial methods cannot deliver unambiguous interpre-
tations. In this perspective, each explanation for why judges decide as they do has to 
look beyond the law itself. Moreover, the Realists suggested investigating the operation 
of law in relation to social reality.
This approach has had a huge impact on legal scholarship and practice in the United 
States, and it inspired many subsequent schools of legal thought in the twentieth centu-
ry. Although Sociological Jurisprudence, Critical Legal Studies or Law & Economics dif-
fer in terms of their political orientations and disciplinary origins, they share the basic 
understanding of the non-legal foundations of judicial action claimed by Legal Realism 
(Kitch 1983; Trubek 1984). As a consequence, the autonomy of the legal system (and 
of law as a discipline) was increasingly questioned (Posner 1987). In Political Science, 
so-called “Political Jurisprudence,” which emphasized the political character of judicial 
action as described above, initially became infl uential in the 1950s (Shapiro 1964a, b).
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What were the main topics and perspectives of this research stream, which embodies 
the distinct character of the US-literature on courts and politics? “The core of Politi-
cal Jurisprudence is a vision of courts as political agencies and judges as political ac-
tors.” This quotation, taken from a landmark article written by Martin Shapiro in 1964, 
specifi es the two different wings of Political Jurisprudence (Shapiro 1964b: 296). The 
macro-level institutionalist approach aimed at analyzing courts as part of the broader 
institutional structure of the US-American government and as participants of the po-
litical process. Inspired by group theory, scholars investigated the interaction of courts 
and interest groups that dominated US-American politics at that time. Shapiro saw the 
courts as the last resort for those interests lacking “immediate political power” and ac-
cess to legislative actors (Shapiro 1961).
By contrast, the micro-level behavioral approach focused on the decision-making pro-
cess of the judges (Schubert 1958). Once scholars of Political Jurisprudence had claimed 
that judges make rather than discover law, the question arose as to what – if not legal 
reasoning – determines judicial decisions. With his very infl uential work on the Roose-
velt court, Charles H. Pritchett introduced behavioralism into US-American judicial 
studies (1948). He examined the phenomenon that the number of individual opinions, 
written by Supreme Court judges in addition to the court opinion, has continuously in-
creased since Roosevelt’s presidency. He explained the rising importance of concurring 
or even dissenting opinions, with an increasing willingness on the part of the judges to 
express individual values and preferences. In the context of the behavioral revolution in 
American Political Science, this approach became the predominant research perspective 
in the area of courts and politics with several important implications.
First, a major part of US-American research still perceives the courts as a conglomera-
tion of individual judges. The analysis of judicial activity focuses on their individual 
decisions, which are explained in terms of policy preferences, values, and attitudes. The 
most prominent theoretical approach in this area is the so-called “Attitudinal Model of 
Judicial Behavior” (Segal/Spaeth 1993). Its underlying assumption can be captured by 
the principal–agent framework: once a judge of the Supreme Court2 has achieved life 
tenure and the peak level of his career, he becomes independent of those actors who 
appointed him, the result being that the principal can no longer control his agent. As a 
consequence, personal preferences and values are the most important variables in ex-
plaining judicial behavior: “Justice William J. Brennan decided cases as he did because 
he was liberal; Justice William Rehnquist or Warren Burger, because they were conser-
vative” (Spaeth 1995: 305).
2 Segal and Spaeth always emphasized that their model aims at explaining the behavior of US Su-
preme Court judges. The authors concede that judicial behavior might differ from their model 
to the extent that, for example, lower courts work in a different environment (Spaeth 1995). 
Since today eighty percent of the literature on courts and politics still focuses on the US Su-
preme Court, this limitation has not affected the success of the model.
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Second, this anecdote indicates the particular understanding of judicial power which 
is inherent in the “attitudinal model.” Earlier scholars, such as Robert Dahl, had ques-
tioned that judges dispose of any independent power fl owing from their affi liation with 
the party which appointed them (Dahl 1957). By contrast, in the perspective of the 
“attitudinal model” judges are very independent and have a large amount of leeway to 
pursue mere policy preferences. Their room to maneuver is guaranteed by an insti-
tutional setting that ensures their income and position. Once a judge is appointed to 
the Supreme Court bench, institutional restrictions (or party affi liations) hardly play a 
role any more. For this reason, institutions have almost disappeared from the research 
agenda.
With the predominance of behavioralism in Political Jurisprudence the institutionalist 
wing of the debate fell more and more into oblivion (Gillman 2004). “Political Jurispru-
dence,” which had claimed the linkage between jurisprudence and politics, redefi ned its 
research agenda toward the analysis of “judicial behavior,” which replaced jurisprudence 
with politics. This disciplinary evolution was not uncontested. Martin Shapiro advised 
the community not to neglect the role of legal doctrine, claiming that it was in the realm 
of legal reasoning that the judges pursued politics (Shapiro 1964a: 40). And even one of 
the founding fathers of behavioralism in the fi eld of courts and politics, Charles Her-
man Pritchett, became ever more skeptical: 
Political scientists who have done so much to put the “political” in “political jurisprudence” 
need to emphasize that it is still “jurisprudence.” It is judging in a political context, but it is still 
judging; and judging is something different from legislating or administering.
(Pritchett 1969: 42)
The situation changed to some extent with the emergence of the “new institutionalism” 
in Political Science, which also affected the research community interested in courts and 
politics (Smith 1988). Hall and Taylor distinguish between three different approaches: 
the Rational Choice Institutionalism, the Sociological Institutionalism and the Histori-
cal Institutionalism (Hall/Taylor 1996). In the fi eld of courts and politics, two rather 
than three camps have been active. The larger group of scholars embraces a Rational 
Choice Institutionalism (which emphasizes choice rather than institutions), while a mi-
nority group is devoted to a “historical-interpretive account” (Gillman 2004), in which 
the historical and the sociological approaches overlap.
Rational Choice Institutionalism is predominantly embodied in the so-called “strate-
gic model of judicial decision-making” (Epstein/Knight 1998). Although this approach 
takes institutional factors on board, its inventors do not anchor it in the institutional-
ist tradition, but describe it as a reaction to the defi cits of the behavioral approach. In 
doing so, they refer to an earlier work of Walter Murphy, who had already made use of 
the rational choice paradigm (Murphy 1964). Moreover, they describe their work as an 
answer to the emergence of “law and economics”: 
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Over the past decade or so, numerous law and business school professors have been touting 
what they call positive political theory (PPT), consisting of “non-normative, rational-choice 
theories of political institutions,” as an appropriate framework for the study of judicial decision-
making. In some sense, then, these professors are asking us modern-day political scientists and 
our students to take Murphy’s intuitions seriously and to integrate them into our work. Should 
we take heed? The answer we offer … is yes. (Epstein/Knight 1998: xiii)
Their model was heavily inspired and prepared by earlier scholars who thought in the 
same direction (Eskridge 1991; Schwartz 1992; Spiller 1992, Cameron 1993).
Just like the attitudinal model, the strategic account argues that judges seek to realize 
policy preferences. But Epstein and Knight assert that judges are not unconstrained in 
their decisions. Instead, they are thought to act strategically in that their choices depend 
on their expectations about the choices of other actors, namely the other judges of the 
bench, the Congress, and the President (and public opinion). Institutions are regarded 
as important to the extent that they structure the interaction between the players. More 
precisely, they infl uence the formation of expectations about the preferences and likely 
decisions of the other actors involved.
By acknowledging the impact of the legislative branch on the behavior of judges, the 
strategic model responds to the “old” demand put forward by Martin Shapiro, which 
suggested analyzing courts in their interaction with other political agencies. But the 
difference to Shapiro (and the proximity to the attitudinal model) lies in the fact that 
courts are still not regarded as an institution, but as a conglomeration of individual 
policy-seeking judges. In this respect, the institutionalist part of the approach remains 
weak, as routines, roles or procedures deriving from the institutional environment and 
the context of law in which judges maneuver do not seem to play a major (socializing or 
structuring) role. Therefore one could describe the strategic model as a more sophisti-
cated version of the attitudinal model.
The historical-interpretive account embraces a mixture of sociological and historical 
institutionalism (Clayton/Gillmann 1999). It assumes a more important role for insti-
tutions on judicial decision-making and emphasizes the particular features of judicial 
action (as opposed to legislative action). Studies in this area explore the particular role 
and self-description of judges (Gillman 1999), the infl uence of informal hierarchy and 
internal decision-making procedures on the bench (Davis 1999), or the institution-
al norms and organizational conditions which have an impact on judicial decisions 
(O’Brien 1999). Hence, most of these studies tend to treat judges as a part of an institu-
tional setting provided by the court and the law.
The core topic of this tradition is the importance of legal ideas and legal doctrine for 
court decisions. The particular achievement of the historical-interpretive approach is 
the rediscovery of the rule of law. From sociological institutionalism it borrows a very 
broad defi nition of an institution, which also includes cognitive structures. In this per-
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spective, legal doctrine and discourse is regarded as an institution. Political scientists 
often hesitate to embrace this kind of defi nition. But here it is argued that the character 
of the legal discourse is very distinctive from political discourse as it follows strongly 
formalized rules of doctrine and reasoning which structure the result (Smith 1988). The 
underlying assumption is that the legal sphere disposes of some kind of autonomy and 
cannot be fully explained by extra-legal factors. Hence, while the behavioralist and stra-
tegic approaches have claimed that all law is politics, the historical-interpretive account 
reintroduces the particular character of the law and legal system.
It is assumed that legal procedures and legal ideology shape not only the interactions 
but also the preferences of the judges and of society at large:
Legal ideologies are relatively autonomous structures with their own peculiar internal character, 
so that they sometimes act as independent variables that transcend and actually help shape the 
content of the immediate self-interest of social groups. (Smith 1988: 98)
Moreover, scholars investigate how legal meaning itself is constructed (Silverstein 1996). 
Here, the infl uence of social constructivism on sociological institutionalism becomes 
obvious (Hall/Taylor 1996: 15).
A strong historical dimension is inherent in this body of work. In this perspective, courts 
shape politics through the development of legal doctrine over time (Feeley/Rubin 1998; 
Novkov 2001). Although the notion of path dependency is rarely used, there is a path-
dependent understanding of change, as the creeping process of shaping legal doctrine 
into another direction unfolds step by step over long periods of time. The results deriv-
ing from this type of analysis are often surprising. This is especially the case with regard 
to the interpretation of the Roosevelt era.
As already mentioned, under the New Deal a major topic for Political Jurisprudence was 
the interaction between the Roosevelt government and the Supreme Court. While the 
court initially repealed much legislation in the area of tax and labor law, it eventually ac-
cepted regulatory state policies. Conventional wisdom has explained this shift by refer-
ence to the so-called “court-packing plan” of the Roosevelt government (Leuchtenberg 
1995). The argument goes as follows: After having been reelected, Roosevelt planned an 
institutional reform of the Supreme Court which aimed at increasing the number of 
judges from nine to fi fteen. This reform would have enabled him to gain a majority on 
the bench by appointing new judges. In order to avoid this scenario, so the argument 
goes, the judges changed their minds about the regulatory state (“a switch in time that 
saved nine”). The crucial case, which has traditionally been seen as a radical break with 
past decisions, was West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish, in which a female hotel employee fi led a 
lawsuit against her former employer, asking for back pay under a state statute mandat-
ing a minimum wage for women.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 07 /5
But using a historical-interpretive account, Julie Novkov showed that the ruling in this 
case did not refl ect a major and disruptive shift in jurisprudence, but it was the cul-
mination of a development in legal doctrine that had unfolded over a long time pe-
riod. The innovation (only) lay in the extension of an already established standard that 
was applied from female workers to all workers. Hence, the court-packing plan did not 
evoke a radical shift in jurisprudence. And the judges did not react to a legislative threat 
but developed a new jurisprudence incrementally. According to Novkov, in this process 
“nodes of confl ict” were crucial “moments in the development of doctrine during which 
the various groups of actors who have access to the legal community struggle among 
themselves and with each other to establish their interpretations of a particular legal 
concept or phrase as the dominant norm” (Novkov 2001: 16). In her account, the poli-
tics of judicial action lies in the capacity of individual or collective actors to infl uence 
the legal doctrine, by mobilizing intellectual or material resources. Her analysis goes 
beyond the courtroom in claiming that political infl uence does not necessarily have to 
stem from the judges’ policy preferences; instead there might be a political process of 
interest intermediation between societal groups and the court with regard to the mean-
ing of legal provisions and cases.3 I will return to this argument in the following section 
when the European research is discussed.
To sum up, one can broadly distinguish two different phases in the development of the 
US-American research on courts and politics. In the formative period, scholars practiced 
law avoidance, emphasizing the extra-legal factors of judicial decision-making. Perhaps 
this was necessary to discover the fi eld as a topic for Political Science. In any case this 
was driven by the impact of the behavioral approach in general. Since the emergence of 
the new institutionalism, a tendency has gained support that takes law more seriously 
and focuses on the interaction of the courts with other political institutions.
European courts and Political Science
As already mentioned, research on European courts has only recently emerged; courts 
have attracted scholarly attention from the 1980s on. The landscape is somewhat frag-
mented, and there is no coherent theoretical framework integrating the different streams 
in the literature. Moreover, the various bodies of work do not systematically talk to one 
another. Research on the European Court of Justice has developed rather independently 
from the area of judicial politics, using mainly its own paradigms drawn from inter-
national relations and theories on European integration (Weiler 1991; Garrett 1992; 
3 This argument is also put forward by Epstein and Knight in their strategic model of judicial 
decision-making. They claim that judges do not only consider their own preferences or those of 
the legislative actors but they also respond to the public for the sake of institutional legitimacy 
(Epstein/Knight 1998: 46–49).
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Burley/Mattli 1993; Garrett 1995).4 The fi ndings on national courts provided by Eu-
ropean scholars are only loosely and partially connected to the US-American debates 
(De Franciscis/Zannini 1992; Koppen 1992; Verougstraete 1992; Landfried 1994), while 
most US-Americans working on Europe link their analysis explicitly to the fi ndings of 
Political Jurisprudence (Stone 1992a; Volcansek 2001). This diversity notwithstanding, 
there seems to be some common ground making up the distinctiveness of the literature 
on European courts. Table 1 compares the major features of the debate.
Table 1 Different research perspectives on courts and politics
USA Europe
Level of analysis Micro-level: judge Macro-level: court
Dimension of analysis Process: politics of judicial 
action
Effects: political impact and 
functions of judicial action
Perception of the legal system Extension of political system Autonomous sphere
Interaction of legal  and political 
system
Politicization: politics invades 
legal sphere
Juridifi cation: judicial action 
invades or displaces politics
The (re)discovery of judicial action in Europe is to some extent related to the institu-
tionalist turn in Political Jurisprudence. In the 1990s, established US-American schol-
ars, such as Martin Shapiro, turned to analyzing European courts, collaborated with 
younger colleagues and thereby “exported” the institutionalist wing of their domes-
tic research traditions (Shapiro/Stone 1994a; Shapiro/Stone Sweet 2002). The major 
focus was placed on the interaction of courts and other political actors. Against this 
background, courts are invariably conceptualized as unitary, institutional actors. Hence, 
while a large part of the US-American research has predominantly pursued the micro-
level behavioralist path of Political Jurisprudence for many decades, research on Euro-
pean courts has concentrated on the macro-level institutionalist wing.
The fact that many European courts function as “collegial enterprises” is conducive to 
the predominance of the institutionalist perspective (Kornhauser/Sager 1993: 1). While 
– as already mentioned – US-American Supreme Court judges are free to publish con-
curring or dissenting opinions in addition to the single opinion of the court, many 
judges in Europe are not allowed to do so. And even where individual votes are reported 
and diverging opinions are revealed, this is only rarely exploited as a resource (Stone 
1994: 444–445).
But the emphasis on the institutionalist perspective does not only respond to differing 
structures of the legal system but also indicates a different general approach. It is ar-
gued that it is not the individual vote but the majority of votes that counts: “Individual 
judges vote, as do individual legislators or cabinet ministers, but the policy that governs 
is the one that achieves the winning majority” (Volcansek 2001: 348–349). This quota-
4 The most explicit reference to Political Jurisprudence is offered by Karen Alter, who investigates 
the role of national courts in the making and supremacy of European law (Alter 2001).
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tion already indicates the second crucial difference in the literature: while a distinctive 
part of the US-American research focuses on the process of judicial decision-making 
(how judges decide), the work on Europe deals almost exclusively with the effects of 
court decisions. In what way does the European Court of Justice contribute to Europe-
an integration (Burley/Mattli 1993; Weiler 1994)? How do courts infl uence policy pro-
cesses (Stone 1992a) and public policies (Jackson/Tate 1992)? Under what conditions 
do courts block or foster policy change (Landfried 1994; Tsebelis 1995, 2000; Volcansek 
2001)? It is also this outcome-perspective which nourishes the debate on courts as one 
of several regulatory agencies and which links courts to policy analysis (Guarnieri/Pe-
derzoli 2002).
Many of these studies fi nd more or less a process of juridifi cation in which judicial 
actors, procedures and categories gradually dominate or displace legislative politics 
(Stone 1992a; Vallinder 1994b; Barreiro 1998). Due to a fear of court censure, so the 
argument goes, legislative actors sacrifi ce policy goals in order to conform to court ju-
risprudence. Moreover, legal arguments and considerations are thought to enter into 
the policy-making process (Stone 1992a, 1994; Landfried 1994). And regulation by the 
state is displaced by court regulation (Hildebrand/Waarden 2005).5 This perspective 
describes the interaction of law and politics in the opposite direction, compared to the 
US-American literature that investigates the politics of judicial action and the politiciza-
tion of the legal system.
The concept of juridifi cation involves a particular understanding of the legal system. 
While Political Jurisprudence conceives of judicial action as political action by other 
means, the work on European courts emphasizes the relative autonomy and distinctive-
ness of the legal sphere. The bulk of the literature does not regard judicial and political 
action as interwoven, but they are described as separate ideal types: legal action is said 
to be “rule laden” while political action is “interest driven” (Stone 1994); judges are sup-
posed to argue while politicians bargain, judicial decisions are alleged to be made by 
deliberation while political decisions are based on the “majority principle” (Vallinder 
1994b) and so on.
Similar to the historical-interpretive institutionalist account in the US-American litera-
ture, the European perspective stresses the impact of the “rule of law” (legal doctrine 
and reasoning) on politics. Courts are perceived as distinctive insofar as the legal sys-
tem “generates a kind of policy-making style itself” (Shapiro/Stone 1994a: 399). But 
while the US-American historical-interpretive account takes the distinctiveness of the 
5 The linkage between courts and regulation is controversial. Some scholars argue that the in-
creasing power of judges can be traced back to the expansion of the regulatory state: “Obvi-
ously, where a legal rule exists there is also a judge who may be asked to interpret and apply 
it”(Guarnieri/Pederzoli 2002: 7). But others argue that deregulation does not diminish but in-
creases judicial activity further. For example, Youri Hildebrand and Frans van Waarden have 
shown that the deregulation of various branches in Europe was accompanied by a higher level 
of litigation (Hildebrand/Waarden 2005). 
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legal sphere as a starting point to investigate how the development of legal doctrine is 
infl uenced by politics, research on Europe tends to treat this aspect as a black box and 
confi nes the analysis to the effects of the rule of law on politics and public policies.
Inherent in the perception of the legal system as an autonomous entity is a particular 
understanding of judicial power. In the behavioralist “attitudinal model” judicial power 
is almost unconstrained, which derives from an institutional environment enabling 
the judges to pursue sincere values and policy preferences. And the “strategic model” 
assumes the dependence of the judges on the other actors involved (e.g. concurrent 
majorities in the legislative branches). By contrast, the European literature discusses an-
other, and specifi cally judicial, power resource: legal knowledge and professional skills. 
Judges are not regarded as politicians, but as politically relevant (epistemic) experts or 
technocrats. Judicial power, so the argument goes, increases to the extent that judges 
and lawyers (and politicians) declare a political question as a “technical question” which 
falls into the jurisdictional domain of the legal profession.
This argument was most explicitly put forward in the neofunctionalist account of Euro-
pean integration. The argument goes as follows: the European Court of Justice was able 
to promote integration in those domains which had been insulated and shielded against 
political intervention before by declaring them to be technical. In this perspective, the 
main power resource of judges is to act as nonpolitically as possible: 
Herein … lies a paradox that sheds a different light on the supposed naiveté of legalists. At 
a minimum, the margin of insulation necessary to promote integration requires that judges 
themselves appear to be practicing law rather than politics. Their political freedom of action 
thus depends on a minimal degree of fi delity to both substantive law and the methodological 
constraints imposed by legal reasoning. In a word, the staunch insistence on legal realities as 
distinct from political realities may in fact be a potent political tool. (Burley/Mattli 1993: 44)
Here and there, the emphasis on the autonomy of the legal system seems to be ground-
ed in the systems theory tradition. The literature on the European Court of Justice, 
where neo-functionalism plays a major role, is one example (Burley/Mattli 1993; Stone 
Sweet 1999). Another area is the debate on the “globalization of American law” (Kele-
men/Sibbitt 2004), fostered by the idea that all legal systems might converge on the US-
American model. With regard to Europe, critics of this thesis take the autonomy of the 
legal sphere as a starting point to argue that this development is very unlikely (Teubner 
1998; Levi-Faur 2005). The principle of “autopoiesis,” which means that law and the 
legal system reproduce themselves according to their own norms and logic, is thought 
to shield the legal system to some extent against external political invasion. This general 
idea, although rarely explicitly linked to systems theory, makes up the major body of 
work on European courts.
While all these studies on European courts are theoretically and empirically very rich, 
the starting assumption of US-American Political Jurisprudence has not received the 
attention it potentially deserves. Research on Europe tends to ask how judicial argu-
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ments and action enter and affect the policy process. But Political Jurisprudence was 
(also) interested in the question of how politics infl uences jurisprudence.
These diverging perspectives can be explained by the different scholarly projects pur-
sued in the US-American and European literature. One major aim of Political Juris-
prudence was to refl ect on the discipline of law, challenging the idea of neutral legal 
reasoning. By contrast, European research is driven by political scientists interested in 
European integration or comparative studies of the interplay of political institutions. 
From the US-American debate European scholars learned that courts are infl uential 
political actors, but they do not necessarily share the goal of demystifying the discipline 
of law. Here and there, one has the impression that some European scholars do not 
even deny the possibility of neutral judicial action, e.g. when judges are characterized as 
“impartial” (Vallinder 1994b: 92) or when it is argued that judicial discretion plays a role 
only rarely, but that, in most cases, the application of law is “fairly straightforward” (De 
Franciscis/Zannini 1992; Verougstraete 1992: 94). By contrast, Political Jurisprudence 
claims that the application of law is never straightforward because legal reasoning and 
judicial methods cannot deliver unambiguous decisions.
The one political aspect of judicial decision-making which is dealt with in the European 
context is the role of party affi liation. But although judges all over Europe are more or 
less politically appointed, party political infl uence on court decisions is considered to 
be rather low, restricted to very particular policy issues or unclear (Koppen 1990; Land-
fried 1994).
Two major exemptions to the rule should be emphasized. They are provided by US-
American scholars doing research on courts in Europe. Their work integrates the Euro-
pean and the US-American approaches. The fi rst one is Alec Stone Sweet and his work 
on the French conseil constitutionnel (Stone 1992a, b, 1994). His approach is “European” 
in the sense that he shares the assumption of the relative autonomy of the legal sphere 
(Stone 1992a: 10–15). Moreover, he is mostly interested in the effects of the council on 
public policy. At the same time, his work is “US-American” as he investigates the infl u-
ence of party politics on the council’s decisions. But his very rich and interesting work 
is not representative insofar as the French council is not a court, but a third chamber in 
the parliamentary arena. Positions are mainly held by party politicians (not by judges), 
the court is not at all linked to the judicial system, and the individual citizens do not 
have access to it. Hence, what we fi nd is the interplay of different political institutions 
(which is of course a political process). Stone only tends to treat the council as a court, 
because it performs the function of “judicial review,” which in other countries is per-
formed by constitutional courts.6 But actually, he investigates the unique case of politi-
cians exercising jurisprudence (and not of judges shaping politics).
6 This already indicates the functionalist bias of his analysis.
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The second major exemption is the work by Mary Volcansek, who aims at adapting the 
US-American strategic model of judicial decision-making to the European context. She 
combines it with the veto player framework developed by George Tsebelis (1995, 2000, 
2002; Volcansek 2001). Modifi cations of the strategic model refer to the unit of analy-
sis. Volcansek claims that – for reasons discussed above – it is necessary to choose the 
macro-level perspective of courts (instead of analyzing the individual decision-mak-
ing behavior of judges). For this purpose, she suggests making use of the veto player 
framework. She models courts as one of several bargaining partners whose agreement 
is necessary to realize policies.
In this context, she develops an implicit understanding of how judges make decisions. 
She assumes that they either pursue policy preferences (their own or those of one of the 
other bargaining parties) or, “with indifference to the preferences of either other player,” 
they choose to follow the legal model, which – according to Volcansek – means that they 
try to achieve “legal clarity” and “legal accuracy” (Volcansek 2001: 352–353). Hence, a 
clear distinction is again made between political and judicial action when Volcansek 
promotes the idea that courts choose arbitrarily between the different (political or judi-
cial) logics of action, depending on policy issues and circumstances.
Although Volcansek’s endeavor to transplant concepts of Political Jurisprudence more 
explicitly to the European context is very helpful and welcome, I would suggest heading 
in another direction. First, in the course of his ongoing work, Tsebelis himself has – for 
several reasons – increasingly abandoned the idea of analyzing courts as veto players 
(Tsebelis 2002: 226–228). Second, I am not sure if Volcansek’s concept really refl ects 
the state of the US-American debate in the most useful way. My doubts apply to her 
concepts of judicial power and decision-making. Not even Knight and Epstein, who 
argue in favor of the strategic model, assume that judges can more or less independently 
choose between different logics of action, but they aim at showing that courts are gen-
erally constrained. Volcansek’s concept of judicial power is more similar to that of the 
attitudinal model, which assumes much leeway for the judges. Moreover, given that the 
US-American research community (with the exception of the behavioral approach) has 
just rediscovered the role of law and legal reasoning, research on Europe seems to be 
confi rmed rather than disproved in emphasizing the impact of the legal dimension on 
court decisions.
Once one takes law seriously, the question arises of whether we can conceptualize ju-
dicial behavior as a choice between political or judicial action. Political Jurisprudence 
claimed the linkage of both by emphasizing that legal clarity and accuracy can never be 
achieved, but legal decisions always involve political decisions. It seems more appropri-
ate to assume that preferences are shaped and channeled by the obligation of courts to 
deliver principled decisions resting on legal reasoning. Therefore only those preferences 
are enforceable that can be deduced from the statute (and/or prior case decisions) by 
judicial methods. This still leaves much leeway for choice between competing interpre-
tations, but methods of legal reasoning restrict and shape policy choices. Hence, judges 
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who want to pursue policy preferences have to take into account that their decision has 
“to fi t” to existing legal norms or prior jurisprudence. Therefore, I will suggest in the 
concluding section of the paper that it is not the strategic account but the historical-in-
terpretive account of judicial politics which is most promising for the further develop-
ment of research on courts in Europe.
4 Conclusions and suggestions
I would agree with Stone Sweet and Volcansek that research on European courts should 
look more closely at the politics of judicial action in Europe. To this end, I want to sug-
gest making use of the historical-interpretive account of judicial politics as exemplifi ed 
by the work of Julie Novkov (see Section 3.2). She analyzes the politics of judicial action 
in terms of the infl uence of societal actors on the development of legal doctrine. Her 
analysis is not limited to the courtroom or to the preferences of the judges on the bench, 
but includes broader processes of interest mobilization. This approach has particular 
advantages, especially with regard to its application in a European context.
First, the literature has often hinted at the fact that research strategies and methods 
of the US-American context are not easily exported to Europe, given that the deci-
sion-making processes of European courts are much less transparent than those of the 
Supreme Court (Stone 1994: 444–445; Volcansek 2001: 348; Tsebelis 2002: 227). That is 
why it is diffi cult to evaluate the judges’ policy preferences. But we can evaluate whether 
and how political actors (e.g. interest groups, parties) try to infl uence the development 
of legal doctrine in the offi cial process which takes place before the court makes a deci-
sion. A court decision does not occur out of nowhere, but responds to a legal discourse 
unfolding over a longer time period – sometimes months, sometimes even years. In 
most cases the universe of competing legal concepts is obvious before the judges make 
a decision, and the court merely picks one of them, perhaps with some modifi cations. 
This means that political interests have to be translated into legal language in order to 
become successful. We can analyze how these concepts and translations emerge, how 
they are linked to political interests, which intellectual and material resources are used 
to help them become the dominant norm, and to what extent they are selected by the 
court. Methodologically, we can make use of the framework provided by Sociology or 
the Political Science of Knowledge (Berger/Luckmann 1966; Nullmeier/Rueb 1993).
Second, as already indicated, this approach also resumes the European tradition of ana-
lyzing interest group politics, thereby defl ecting the research perspective from corporat-
ist policy-making toward the role of legal action. In policy fi elds which are considered 
as particularly legalized, this might be an especially promising endeavor. In this context, 
European research could learn from another large body of US-American literature on 
law and politics, namely those studies that analyze how interest groups have used the le-
Rehder: What Is Political about Jurisprudence? 23
gal system to foster social and policy change (Scheingold 1974; Auerbach 1976; Handler 
1978; Handler et al. 1978; Chong 1991; Epp 1998; Barnes 2006). Even if particular strat-
egies, such as fi ling class action lawsuits, do not play a role in Europe, US-American 
research has shown that this kind of litigation is only one (and not even the most im-
portant) among various strategies for infl uencing legal development.
The third and major advantage of Novkov’s account is that she neither glorifi es nor 
denies the role of law and legal reasoning, but she assumes that the development of 
legal doctrine is a process heavily infl uenced by politics. This approach can integrate 
the best parts of US-American Political Jurisprudence into the European work, thereby 
preserving the strengths of the latter. If Alec Stone is right in claiming that Europe suf-
fers from a tradition of the separation of law and politics and of regarding the realm 
of law as the sovereign territory of the legal profession, the project of Political Juris-
prudence to demystify this is more important in Europe than anywhere else. It would 
also be extremely useful to reveal that the development of legal doctrine and discourse 
(and therefore court decisions) can be analyzed as a political process of political interest 
intermediation.
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